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ABSTRACT
Replay attack and password attacks are serious issues in the Kerberos authentication protocol. Many ideas
have been proposed to prevent these attacks but they increase complexity of the total Kerberos
environment. In this paper we present an improved method which prevents replay attacks and password
attacks by using Triple password scheme. Three passwords are stored on Authentication Server and
Authentication Server sends two passwords to Ticket Granting Server (one for Application Server) by
encrypting with the secret key shared between Authentication server and Ticket Granting server. Similarly,
Ticket Granting Server sends one password to Application Server by encrypting with the secret key shared
between TGS and application server. Meanwhile, Service-Granting-Ticket is transferred to users by
encrypting it with the password that TGS just received from AS. It helps to prevent Replay attack.
KEYWORDS
Kerberos Protocol, Password Attack, Authentication Server, Replay Attack, Ticket Granting Server,
Application Server
1. INTRODUCTION
Security in today’s world is a major concern. As networks grow, they provide more and more
services. Providing these services to the user in a secure way is an issue. Attackers can easily gain
information during its transmission across the network and then gain unauthorized access to the
servers, to whom they are not able to access. For example, in a distributed environment, nodes or
computer are distributed across the network, users want to access services that are stored on
servers and servers are distributed. So, in this scenario, servers should be able to authenticate all
requests for services. Authentication is a way of ensuring that no one can access the system
without providing the way that he has access right. Therefore, instead of each server check
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request for services, Kerberos provides a central server which does the task of authentication. If
an authorized user gains access to the resources, he may either gain access to secret information
or may damage resources such as Information stored in the database. Therefore, security is
needed at all places in today world from protecting computer resources to the protection of a
nation. But security involves implementation of measures to protect attacks. But it does not mean
that an attack ill never occur. For example, preventing an outside attacks doesn’t’ mean that you
are secure, attacks may occur from inside of organization. Researchers have proved that many
attacks occur from inside of the organization. Therefore, it is necessary to provide security inside
of an organization. Authentication protocol is one of the most classical single sign-on protocols.
A single sign-on system means that a user can access all services from the application servers
after only sign on one time in a multiple application systems. Kerberos V5 is being used at
present but there are lots of replay and password attack problems in it [1]. Kerberos V5 was
designed to overcome some of the deficiencies of Kerberos V4, but it can’t guarantee to avoid
replay and password attack. This paper provides triple layer of security. If an attacker successes in
gaining access to the ticket-granting-ticket (TGT) and obtaining Ticket-granting-service from
Ticket Granting Server (TGS), he will not be able to perform replay attack because authentication
server will ask the Ticket-Granting-Service provider (user) about the password.
2. RELATED WORK
Many schemes have been proposed to prevent replay attack in Kerberos authentication protocol.
Jian [2] proposed an optimized way to prevent password attack and replay attack in single Sign-
on system. Multiple databases were added to provide the authentication and authorization in order
to prevent replay attack. In this approach, Authentication Server sends Ticket-Granting-Ticket to
user as well as to Ticket- Granting-Server (TGS).Similarly; TGS sends Service-Granting-Ticket
to both Client and Application server. TGS and Application server, each has their own database.
They store these tickets in their database and if attacker replays Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) or
Service-Granting-Ticket, they can easily detect whether this is an attack or not
A dynamic double password based sign-on protocol was proposed [3]. That protocol makes use of
two passwords that are needed during the user registration and log files concept was used. Log
file contained the details when a particular user visited to a server which could be a authentication
server, Ticket Granting Server or Application Server. Application server generates log file and
forwards to authentication server even after responding the user. Authentication server passes this
log file to clients. Similarly, Authentication server also passes its log file. Therefore, a user can
make a judgment on security of password through auditing log files and allowed to modifying the
password. So, if an attacker has captured a password, client can easily change it by looking and
analyzing at the log files.
In [4], a concept is provided to prevent replay attack in Kerberos by using a freshness which
makes use of new Symbolic Model Verifier.
Location based Kerberos authentication protocol is described in [5].  In this approach server
captures P(Y) code off all the client in the network and it assigns ticket granting ticket to the
client by encrypting session key( used for communication between TGS and client) and TGT
with the P(Y) code of user. After receiving this message, client accepts its P(Y) code using GPS
and decrypts the message. So, if an attacker is able to capture the message, then he will not be
able to decrypt the message because P(Y) code length is in several of gigabits. It will result in the
failure of the ticket due to time synchronization problems. Here, user physical location is added as
an additional message into the Kerberos protocol, which helps to determine physical location of
the message provider. Server sends (TGT) to client by encrypting session key with the hash value
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of user physical location. So, even if an attacker captures a message, he will have to break two
phase security to get session ticket and in this process, ticket time may expire.
Capturing user physical location and adding it as a new authentication factor into the Kerberos
Protocol method [7] was proposed to prevent replay attack. It used N-BAN logic (modified
version of BAN logic [6]) to apply on the modified Kerberos protocol.
Benjamin [8] proposes a method for the inspection of replay attacks on Kerberos authentication
protocol in which the protocol was specified by using the Object-Z.
Modified Symbolic Model verifier [9] approach was presented to find problems with respect to
the replay attack.
Some basic principles [10] were defined which are necessary to be used while designing the
cryptography protocols. Five different strategies are presented. By using these strategies it is
possible to design cryptographic protocols which show robustness against different classes of
replay attacks.
A new protocol for key distribution was proposed [11] after analysing the security flaws with
different protocols that are currently used for the authentication as well as for key distribution.
This proposed model is based on using symmetric keys.
This paper is further organized into the following sections: Section III provides an overview
about the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Section IV provides some limitations about
Kerberos authentication protocol. In section V, we proposed our new method to prevent replay
attack in Kerberos environment which makes use of three passwords from the users and look how
this architecture provides protection against password and replay attack.
3. OVERVIEW OF KERBEROS PROTOCOL
Kerberos is an authentication protocol which is used to authenticate users in the distributed
environment. Using Kerberos authentication protocol, a client can authenticate itself to multiple
servers using its password which is also known as the long term secret key. Client receives
Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) from the Authentication Server (AS) and this ticket can be used for
multiple services that a client needed. Therefore, client stores this Ticket-Granting-Ticket in its
database. Then, it requests for Service-Granting-Ticket and stores it in its database[12].An
advantage of storing Service-Granting-Ticket in database is that client will not have to re-enter
password every time when he has to access the application server such as email server. A
Kerberos environment consists of Key Distribution Center (KDC), a number of clients and
Application Servers. Key Distribution Center (KDC) consists of authentication server (AS) and
Ticket Granting Server (TGS). An AS issues Ticket-Granting-Tickets to the user after the
verification and TGS issues Service-Granting-Tickets to the user. If a client wishes to
authenticate herself to application server, then Kerberos will perform this task in three phases as:
1. Whenever a user logs on to a workstation, the client process running in the workstation
sends a message to the Authentication Server. Authentication Server checks in the
database whether username and password are correct. If all is correct, then Authentication
Server (AS) sends a Ticket-Granting-Ticket to the user and also a session key so that user
can communicate with the server. Same copy of session key is also included in the ticket
that AU issues to the client. Ticket-Granting-Ticket and session key are encrypted using a
key generated from the user password. Because message sent by the AU to client is
encrypted using key generated from user password, only authorized user reads the
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message. Client decrypts the message and gets Ticket-Granting-Ticket that is to be used
for communication with the Ticket Granting Server (TGS).
2. Now, Client presents this Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) to the Ticket Granting Server
along with an authenticator. Authenticator simply includes the ID of the user on client
and also a timestamp. As compared to a ticket, an authenticator has very short life time.
Since, Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) is encrypted with a secret key that is shared
between Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server (TGS). Only TGS can decrypt
the message. After decrypting the message it gets a session key which is used to decrypt
authenticator received from the user. Now, TGS checks the sender details by comparing
TGT with the details in the authenticator and incoming packet network address. If all
details are verified, TGS issues a Service-Granting-Ticket to the client and it is encrypted
using the secret key shared between TGS and application server.TGS also generates a
session key to be shared between client and application server for secure communication.
TGS sends this session key to Server by encrypting it in the ticket and also to the client
by encrypting the message with the session key that was shared between client and TGS.
3. In the third step, client presents this ticket to the server along with an authenticator. Client
encrypts the message by using session key that was sent by the TGS. Server then uses
that session key to encrypt the message from the client. If all credentials of the user are
correct, then application server will issue a response to the client in case if a mutual
authentication is required [13].
Figure 1 shows basic Kerberos architecture. Here, directions of arrows show how data will flow
in the Kerberos environment. Meaning of each number is:
Figure1.  Basic Kerberos Architecture
1. Request for Ticket-Granting-Ticket
2. Ticket-Granting-Ticket + Session Key
3. Request for Service Granting Ticket
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4. Service-Granting-Ticket + Session Key
5. Request Service
6. Provide Service authentication
Meaning of the terms used in the figure is described in the table1 which is given below:
Table1: Meaning of the terms used in Figure1
These six steps form basic Kerberos architecture. The main problem with Kerberos
Authentication protocol is of replay attack. Replay attack is an attack in which attacker captures
messages transmitting through the channel, modifies it and replay back on the transmitting
channel [14]. So, it is necessary to prevent the replay attack especially when two parties need
secure communication over the internet.
4. KERBEROS LIMITATIONS
Although Kerberos is being widely used, but it has a number of limitations which are described
below:
1. Kerberos authentication protocol requires continuous availability of the key distribution
server (KDC). If KDC fails, then the entire Kerberos environment will fail.
2. User must choose strong password. A selection of weak password could result in the
password or replay attack. An attacker can easily break weak password and gain access to
the services stores on the server.
3. System clocks of the clients, Authentication server, key distribution Center and client
should match; otherwise timely attack can be easily performed on the Kerberos protocol.
Kerberos makes use of KDC (Key Distribution Center), KDC uses Kerberos database where
details of all the users are stored. An attacker can perform an attack on this database and may gain
access to the database [15, 16(P 87)].
5. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE KERBEROS PROTOCOL
The main problem with the Kerberos Authentication Protocol is that of replay and password
attack. Problem arises when Authentication Server (AS) sends Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) to
the client process running in the user. Kerberos V5 even can’t avoid the replay attack. An attacker
can capture all the messages transmitting from the Authentication Server (AS) to the user and
apply all possible combination on the messages that he has captured. After applying all the
possible combination of the captured messages, an attacker presents TGT to the Ticket-Granting-
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Server (TGS). TGS checks that this is a valid authenticator, so it passes Service-Granting-Ticket
to the attacker and attacker may gain unauthorized access to the services stored on the
Application Server (which is V in our Figure1).
The proposed Kerberos authentication protocol is shown in Figure 2. In this modified Kerberos
protocol, Ticket-Grating-Server (TGS) presents Session Key to the server by encrypting them
encrypting them with the hash of user password.AS passes two passwords to the TGS and TGS
further passes one password to the Application Server V.
Our Proposed architecture works as follows:
First, a user logs on his workstation and enters the password. If there is the new user then
he will have to enter three passwords to complete his registration. After entering the
passwords, the client process running in the workstation sends a message to the
Authentication Server. This message consists of the Ticket request that client process
requires for communication with the Application server (V).Authentication Server checks
in the database whether user credentials are correct. If these are correct, then
Authentication Server sends Ticket-Granting-Ticket to the client process. Authentication
server stores three passwords in its database.
After responding to the user, Authentication Server sends two user passwords to the TGS.
Client presents Ticket-Granting-Ticket to the TGS along with an authenticator. Here, it
may possible that this ticket and authenticator came from the attacker. TGS decrypts the
TGT and gets session key which will be used for further communication with the client
and also it gets user passwords by decrypting message received from AS with its secret
key.
TGS produces Service-Granting-Ticket and session key to be shared between client and
Application Server. It encrypts the session key with the user password that it received
from the AS. This is very important step because only the valid user will be able to
decrypt the message. If that message to TGS came from the attacker, he will not able to
continue furthest communication. TGS also sends user password to the server by
encrypting it with the secret key that is shared between the TGS and Application Server.
Client finally presents Service-Granting-Ticket to the Application Server V; it will also
send an authenticator by encrypting it with the session key that it just received from the
TGS. Server will receive the message and cheek the credentials of the client with the help
of authenticator that it received from the client. To enhance the security, server will ask
from the user about the password. If this is the client who just sent message to server, he
will immediately tell his password to server by encrypting it with the session key shared
between client and the Application Server. Using session key here is more advantageous
because whenever user will login to his workstation, it will be changed every time.
Server will set a timer at its side and it is used for the detection of any attack. If password
from the client does not arrive within the specified time, then it will send a message to
TGS to tell him that the ticket you just issued had been gained by the attacker.
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Figure2. Proposed Kerberos Architecture
Table2 below shows various Kerberos messages that are used in this proposed method. These
messages are divided into different categories:
1. Messages for obtaining Ticket-Granting-Ticket
2. Messages for obtaining Service-Granting-Ticket
3. Client-Server Messages to obtain Service
Let us now describe the step-by-step working of our proposed algorithm:
(1) During step1 of the algorithm client sends a message to the AS. When client logs on first
time on the workstation, then he will have to enter three passwords. These passwords will
be stored in a database that will be maintained at the AS. Thereafter client will have to
enter only one password. Every time, a user logs on to his workstation, its credentials are
checked against the information maintained at AS. If user credentials are correct, then a
process running in the user workstation will send a message to the AS. This message
consists of the identification of the client and the Server with which the client wants to
communicate.
(2.1) At this step AS sends TGT to the client. It also sends the session key (Kc,tgs) that will be
used for communication between the AS and TGS and this session key (Kc,tgs) is
encrypted with the user password (Kc1) so that only the authorized user can get the
session key.
(2.2) At this step of the algorithm, AS presents two of the passwords (Kc2, kc3) from its
database to the Application server V. As you can see, these passwords are encrypted
with the secret key (Ktgs) that is known only to the AS and TGS.
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Table2. Proposed Kerberos Messages exchange
(3) Because authorized user knows the password, so it gets the session key by decrypting the
message, in this step, client generates an authenticator that consists of network address
from where message came as well as the timestamp value and this authenticator is
encrypted with the session key (kc,tgs). Client presents this authenticator with the TGT
that it received from AS in step 2.1
(4.1) After receiving the ticket in step3, first TGS decrypts it using its private key (Ktgs). After
decryption, it gets the session key (Kc,tgs). Using this session key, TGS decrypts the
authenticator. Now, TGS produces the Service-Granting-Ticket which is encrypted with
the secret key (Kv) shared between TGS and V. TGS also produces the session key (kc,v)
that is sent to the user by encrypting with the user password (Kc2) that TGS received from
AS in step 2.2. This is very important step because if an attacker gains success in
capturing the TGT, h will not be able to replay further messages to the Application Server
(V) because only the authorized user knows the password (Kc2). This step prevents the
replay attack.
(4.2) At this step, TGS sends kc3 (user password) to V by encrypting it with the secret key Kv
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that is shared between the TGS and Application server V. After receiving this message,
Application Server (V) decrypts it using the Kv that is private to V. Sending of this
password will help in detection of attacks such as replay of messages and gaining access
to the user passwords.
(5) Client presents Service-Granting Ticket as well as authenticator to the Server V. At this step,
it may possible that Ticket came from an authorized person or from attacker.
(6) To verify identity of the sender, server asks about the password (Kc3) from the user who sent
the message. As Server V sends a message to the user asking about the password, it sets up a
timer. We can see this message will be encrypted with the session key Kc,v.
(7) If sender is the authorized party, it will immediately tell password to the server and this
password will be sent to the server by encrypting it with the session key (Kc,v).Client will
also send timestamp value indicating the time at which this response was generated.
(8) If sender is confirmed that message came from legitimate client, it will provide response to
the client by incrementing timestamp by 1.this is necessary in case a client required a mutual
authentication. Mutual authentication is requires in which server have also to prove his/her
identity to the user. As we can see that Server V provides incremented value of the
timestamp {T5+1} to the user because client sent timestamp value T5 in the step5 to the
Server V.
(9) If server does not receives the response before its timer gets off, it will be conformed that the
Service-Granting-Ticket came from an attacker. So, Application Server (V) sends an alert
message to the AS informing it about the address from where attack occurred.
(10) Now, TGS further informs to AS about the attack and now, it is the responsibility of the
Authentication Server to inform about the attack. If user password has been compromised,
then AS will inform about this to the user.
So, this architecture can detect whether user password has been compromised. Replay of
messages can also be detected by this architecture.
5.1 How this Architecture prevents from the attacks
Suppose an attacker has applied all the possible combinations and made an guess of the session
key Kc,tgs. Let us look how messages can be replayed by the attacker.
Attack1. When attacker captures the session key: Kc,tgs
Suppose an attacker has captured the session key (Kc,tgs), then he can easily replay messages to the
TGS by hacking the client location. Now, question is that how TGS prevents from this attacker.
Instead of encrypting the session key Kc,v (that is to be shared between the client and Application
Server V) with the Kc,tgs (that has captured or guessed by the attacker), TGS sends it by
encrypting it with the user password (Kc2) that is known only to the user. So, if this ticket was
generated from the attacker, he will not be able to use the service from the Application Server (or
will not be able to replay messages to the Application Server V) because attacker does not know
the user password (Kc2).
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Attack2. When attacker have guessed user password: Kc2
Second problem is that how this architecture prevents from the attack that can occur when an
attacker has made guessed of the user password Kc2. (note that if an attacker has made an guess of
the user password Kc2, then he can easily get access to the session key Kc,v that is to be shared
between the client and application server).
If attacker has access to Kc2, then he can easily perform replay attack on the Application Server.
Our architecture can easily prevent this attack. Now, it is the responsibility of the Server V to
detect the presence of replay attacker.
Suppose, in step 5 it was the attacker who replayed an message to the Application server, Now,
server will ask about the Kc3. An attacker does not know Kc3. Server will use timer to get the
response within the specified time.
So, as we can see our architecture provides triple layer of security. First level of security is
provided by Kc,tgs. This session key will be renewed every time user requires access to a new
service that is stored on a different Application server. Second level of security is provided by the
user password Kc2 stored in the database at TGS. Third level of security is provided by the kc3
which has already been forwarded to the Application server during step 4.2 of the algorithm.
5.2 Advantages of the Proposed Architecture
(i) Provides protection against replay attacks
(ii) It provides triple layer of protection.
(iii) Password attack protection
5.3 Limitation of the Proposed Architecture
(i) When a new user logs on the workstation, then he will have to enter three passwords and
these passwords will be stored at the TGS.
5.4 Comparison with the Figure1
Kerberos architecture shown in the figure1 is the basic Kerberos architecture. Replay and
password attacks can easily be performed in the architecture shown in figure1. Architecture
shown in the figure1 also provides only single level of protection by using session keys that are
renewed every time user logs on to the workstation and requests for service.
But our architecture provides protection against replay as well as against password attack. Our
architecture provides triple level of security as compared with the single level of security. If a
user password has been compromised then architecture shown in figure1 does not address this
issue. Bur using our architecture, user can be informed about the attack and user can take
necessary steps for making change in the password.
6. CONCLUSION
Security is necessary in all aspects of fields. Kerberos provides third party authentication but
many replay attacks occurred on Kerberos. The approach used in this paper attempts to prevent
replay attack by using three passwords, a new user must enter these passwords that will be stored
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on the Authentication Server. If an attacker gains access to TGT, then he can easily replay them
to the TGS, but not to the Application Server (V). The reason for this is that attacker does not
know the password to get session key used for communication with the Server V. So, we have to
prevent attacks from taking unauthorized take control from system even if he has gain access to
session key and the ticket. The approach used in our proposed architecture provides protection
against replay and password attack.
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